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Abstract Philosophers have shown that the Aristotelian conception of mind and
body (monism) is capable of resolving the problems confronting dualism. In this
paper the resolution of the mind–body problem is extended with a scientific solution
by integrating the (neo) Aristotelian framework with evolutionary theory. It is
discussed how the theories of Fisher and Hamilton (two extensions of Darwin’s
theory) enable us to construct and solve hypotheses about how the mind evolved out
of matter. These hypotheses are illustrated by two examples: the evolutionary
transition from cells to multicellular organisms (with internal and external organs),
and the evolutionary transition from babbling to doing things with words and later
reasoning and giving reasons. The first transitions resulted in the sensitive psyche of
the other animals, the second in the rational psyche of humans. It is discussed how
exploratory behaviour of lower-level entities facilitated these evolutionary
transitions.
1 Introduction
The mind–body problem is a philosophical problem. It has been resolved as the
result of investigations of Hacker, Kenny, Ryle, Wittgenstein and others. They have
shown that elaborations of Aristotle’s conception of the mind and body (monism)
are capable of answering the questions confronting Plato’s, Augustine’s and
Descartes’ dualism. However, their arguments will not be repeated here; I shall only
briefly discuss why contemporary, essentially Cartesian, conceptions of conscious
experiences are highly problematic (Sect. 2) and elaborate some essential
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differences between Cartesian dualism and Aristotelian monism (Sect. 3). What I
shall discuss instead is how we can reconcile the resolution of the mind–body
problem [what Hacker (2007) has called the neo-Aristotelian conception of mind
and body] with scientific insights. I restrict my discussion to the problem of how we
can integrate the neo-Aristotelian conception with evolutionary theory. There is a
simple reason: if we can reconcile the neo-Aristotelian conception with evolutionary
theory, then we must be able to construct testable hypotheses about how the mind or
psyche evolved out of matter. And if we have shown that we can solve some
empirical problems with the aid of the newly constructed conceptual framework, the
resolution is extended with a solution of the mind–body problem.
The integration of the neo-Aristotelian conception of the mind with evolutionary
theory requires a correct interpretation of Darwin’s contribution. The point to notice
is that many philosophers and scientists have mistakenly argued that Darwin
replaced the argument from design (of natural theology) by explanations in terms of
natural selection, while a few correctly argued that Darwin returned to Aristotelian
teleology, eliminated the concept of design, and extended the Aristotelian
framework with evolutionary explanations (see Hacker 2007; chapter, 6; Kenny
1988; Smit 2010a, 2014). Notice that the incorrect interpretation was taken to imply
that Darwin extended mechanistic (proximate) with evolutionary (ultimate)
explanations. That Darwin’s contribution was misinterpreted is one reason why it
appeared to many that the mind–body problem was hard to solve, because they
investigated the problem within the confines of a misguided Cartesian–Darwinian
conceptual framework.
I shall discuss in this paper two extensions of Darwin’s theory that enable us to
form testable hypotheses, namely those made by the evolutionary theorists Fisher
and Hamilton (Sects. 5, 6 and 7). Interestingly, their insights are also conceptual or
philosophical insights. I argue that we can apprehend their contributions if we
discuss their ideas against the background of Wittgenstein’s discussion of
measurement in the natural and mental sciences (Sect. 4). For this enables us to
see how the ideas of Fisher and Hamilton clarify a conceptual observation made by
Wittgenstein and others, namely that we attribute mental predicates to the whole,
behaving organism, not to its parts. This was later called by Hacker a mereological
principle. Understanding the connection between the mereological principle and the
ideas of Fisher and Hamilton, and how we can extend their ideas with facilitated
evolution and language evolution (Sects. 8 and 9), enables us to conclude that, in
principle, the mind–body problem is solved. In a Kuhnian terminology: the new
conceptual framework enables us to construct and solve ‘puzzles’.
2 The Contemporary Conception of the Mind
The contemporary conception argues that conscious experience is the central feature
of the mind. It is developed as a response to central state materialism (which
identifies types of mental states with types of brain states) and functionalism (which
attempts to explain the nature of a mental state by reference to its function in
correlating inputs, behavioural outputs and its causal relations to other mental
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states). Since internal mental states are according to materialism and functionalism
defined solely in terms of brain states or functional terms, critics argued that
something was missing, namely the felt character of the experiences that sentient
creatures enjoy, such as experiences of pain, pleasure, being sad, longing, etc. The
critics made for this reason a contrast between humans (and the other animals) and
creatures who are subject to the same inputs and behavioural outputs, but who do
not enjoy these conscious experiences (called ‘zombies’). This contrast raises the
question what these conscious experiences are (and what their evolutionary
advantages are, etc.).
The conscious experiences are thought to be something essentially subjective and
underlie behaviour. The behaviour that exhibits mental phenomena is merely the
outer husk of the inner psychological reality with which the subject is acquainted.
Notice that this conception of experiences runs parallel to the Cartesian conception,
for Descartes also held that perceptual experience, imagination, cogitation, affection
and volition constitute the domain of consciousness. What was new was how
conscious experiences were characterized. An experience was said to be conscious
if there is something which it is like for the subject to have it (Nagel 1974; see also
Chalmers 1996). That was thought to be the essence of consciousness.
Each conscious experience is argued to have its own qualitative character or its
distinctive phenomenal feel (qualia for short). The individual feel of an experience
is called a quale, signifying the ‘qualitative character of experience’. The subjective
or qualitative feel, following Nagel, can be characterized in terms of there being
‘something it is like’ for an organism to have the experience. A subject of
experience is conscious if there is something that it is like for it to be that subject.
For while there is nothing which it is like for a machine to be a machine, there is
something it is like for a bat to be a bat, for us to be human, etc. However these
ideas are confronted by many problems (see Hacker 2002; Bennett and Hacker
2003, chapters 10 and 11). I shall mention only two of them.
First, it is left unexplained what is meant by the claim that ‘there is something
which it is like to have a given conscious experience’. Defenders of the claim argue
that every experience has a qualitative character. But they apparently confuse here
the quality of what one experiences (the taste of an apple) with the quality of the
experience (delightful). For the perceptual quality is not a quality of a perception (an
experience). The taste of an apple is not a quality of tasting it, but a quality of what
one tastes.
Second, an answer to the question ‘What was it like for you to have an
experience’ is a request for a description of the felt character of the experience.
Hence one may answer by saying: ‘It was delightful’. But this answer does not allow
one to conclude that there was something that it was like for N or for me to
experience E. For the experience was not like delightful; it was delightful. Of
course, it makes sense in certain contexts to ask what it is like to be for example a
soldier, or what it is like for a woman to be a soldier. But these questions are a
request for a description of the pros and cons of a certain role (or of the various
things we do). It demands a specification of the qualitative character of the life a
soldier, of the typical career of a soldier, or what it is like for a woman, as opposed
to a man, to be a soldier. But notice that in all descriptions the ‘like’ drops out in the
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replies. Notice further that we can licitly ask what it is like for a woman to be a
soldier, but not what it is like for a soldier to be a soldier, or for a human being to be
a human being, for a bat to be a bat (the questions that Nagel poses).
What is true is that only conscious, sentient creatures are subjects of experience
and can find them pleasant or unpleasant, interesting or boring, and so forth. But the
question ‘What is it like for a human being to be a human being’ (or for a bat to be a
bat) is illicit. This is not asking what is it like for an X to be a Y, for this question
reiterates the subject term in the object position and has the form ‘What it is like for
an X to be an X?’. If any sense can be made of the question ‘What is it like for a
human being to be a human being?’, it amounts to no more than ‘What is human life
like?’. So too the question ‘What is it like for a bat to be a bat?’ amounts to no more
than ‘What is the life of a bat like?’ It is given by describing their foraging
behaviour, how they communicate, etc. Hence we can simply consult here studies of
zoologists (i.e. behavioural ecologists; see Davies et al. 2012).
It is important to note that this conclusion does not imply that we return to a form
of behaviourism. For we are not denying that human beings, like all other sentient
creatures, have experiences. Behaviourism has some merits but also faults. Its merits
were to emphasize that language learning is based on training. This presupposes
shared behavioural reactions and responses. Behaviourists were also right to
emphasize that acquiring a language is learning new forms of behaviour: children
learn to do things with words in human interactions (they do not learn to translate a
‘Language of Thought’ (LoT) into words and sentences as Pinker (1995) and others
assume,1 for there is no such thing as a LoT (see further Smit 2016)). Logical
behaviourists were also right to highlight that the criteria for attributing mental
predicates to other people are behavioural (what they do and say). But they were
mistaken in conceiving the relationship between the mental attributes and behaviour
reductively (they supposed that the mental is reducible to the behavioural). Yet the
relationships between behavioural and linguistic expressions of the mental are
internal or conceptual: expression constitutes criteria, constitutive evidence, for
ascribing psychological predicates to humans and other animals. The point to notice
that the criterial link is not external or inductive; the behaviour displayed is
normally sufficient to ascribe a psychological attribute to another being, but it is
defeasible. For example the relation between behavioural and linguistic expressions
of an emotion and the emotion is not like the relation between a natural sign (clouds
or smoke) of something and what it is a sign of (rain or fire). It is the relation
between a form and what it is a form of (White 1967, p. 118f.). Clouds may occur
without rain, and someone may tremble without fear. We can also conceal or
pretend an emotion (pretending is not a manifestation of an emotion; it merely looks
like it because one mimics an emotion which one does not feel). These are all
examples of a defeasible evidential relationship. But there is an important
1 Pinker (1995, p. 81) argues that: ‘People don’t think in English or Chinese or Apache; they think in a
language of thought’. Knowing a language is according to him (p. 82) knowing ‘how to translate this
language of thought (or mentalese) into strings of words and vice versa… Indeed, if babies did not have a
mentalese to translate to and from English, it is not clear how learning English could take place, or even
what learning English would mean’. For an apt critical discussion of Chomsky’s and Pinker’s ideas, see
Hacker (1990b) and Evans (2014).
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difference: the relation between rain and a cloud, and between smoke and fire, is
external (inductive), whereas the relation between an emotional expression and
what it is an emotion of is not. We see e.g., the fear, anger or shame in someone’s
face. The facial expressions are not signs of the emotions, but manifestations: they
make the emotion patent. Hence we do not infer an emotion when someone turns
red or deduce one when he or she blushes (by contrast: clouds do not manifest rain
and smoke does not express fire2). Behavioural manifestations are not effects of the
emotion, but the forms they take. Unsurprisingly, we sometimes misinterpret what
we observe, for there are subtle differences between manifestations of emotions, for
example when we listen to someone it may sound like affection but was no more
than courtesy (notice that this argument does not apply to innate expressions of
emotions).
3 The Neo-Aristotelian and Cartesian Conception of the Mind
I discuss in this section briefly two essential differences between Cartesian dualism
and neo-Aristotelian monism (see Hacker 2007, chapters 8, 9 and 10; Kenny 1989,
chapters 1, 2 and 3).
First, according to Aristotle there is only one world, while Descartes
distinguished two worlds, namely the physical world containing matter, energy
and all the tangible bodies (including the human body and its brain), and the
psychical world consisting of mental events, processes and states which are
inaccessible to public observation. Although Descartes distinguished two separate
worlds, he left in his dualism space for a mysterious interaction between these two
worlds. The mind is according to Descartes united to the pineal gland (what we now
call the pineal body).
The Cartesian distinction between the two worlds leads to an unresolvable
problem: how can we measure the mind? For the res cognitans, in contrast to the res
extensa, does not consist of matter in extension. As the evolutionary biologist
Williams (1985, p. 22) put it: ‘the power of positive thinking has never been
measured in calories per second, nor a burden of grief in grams’. And if we cannot
measure one of the two substances involved, we also cannot answer the question of
how the mind is related to (or interacts with) the body or brain. The neo-Aristotelian
conception resolves this Cartesian problem in a simple way: Aristotle argued
correctly that there is no relation between the mental and the physical, between
mind and body (or brain). The mind is manifest or expressed in behaviour, but an
expression does not mean that there are mysterious mental processes occurring in a
separated realm behind the observable behavioural and linguistic expressions of the
mental (see further Sect. 4). Neo-Aristotelians, living in a post-Darwinian era, add
that we can observe and measure the expressions by investigating the different
2 Of course, ‘Here lions threat, there elephants will range, and camel-necks to vapoury dragons
change…’. But this line, taken from a poem of Goethe about clouds, only shows that clouds, by taking
temporarily certain physical appearances, look like animals.
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forms of expressive behaviour and how these evolved during the course of
evolution.
Second, Descartes’ distinction between the two worlds is linked to his distinction
between humans and the other animals and differs therefore from Aristotle’s
distinction. According to Descartes only humans possess a mind, whereas the other
animals are mere machines. Aristotle, by contrast, argued that humans are not minds
united to a machine, but living organisms, i.e. living bodies of a certain kind. He
characterized human beings as distinct from other animals and plants by observing
what they can do. According to him, the psyche informs a natural body that has life
and this is visible in the exercise of capacities. And since the psyche is ascribed to
living organisms, the capacities that constitute the psyche cease to exist when the
living animal dies. In Descartes’ dualism, by contrast, the mind is not the form of
the living body that has life, but a separate, immaterial substance.
Aristotle ascribed the psyche to the (whole) living organism. He argued that not
only humans but also plants and the other animals possess a psyche. Plants possess a
vegetative and the other animals on top of that possess a sensitive psyche. Humans
are unique because they possess a rational psyche (the rational powers of the
intellect and the will), for, neo-Aristotelians argue, only humans use a language. The
use of a language enables humans, in contrast to the other animals, to possess
objective and abstract information which they can use to reason, to freely pursue
goals formulated by the intellect, and to make decisions. But how do children
acquire the ability to reason and think? Neo-Aristotelians argue that children learn
to reason and think when they learn to transform expressions according to a
paradigm. For example when we explain to children that lions are carnivores and
ask them what Simba, a lion, will prefer (a piece of meat or an apple?), we teach
them what an inference is (what correct answers are). The point to notice is that
rules of inference do not follow from the meaning of the logical constants and
quantifiers involved in inferences, but are constitutive of the meaning of logical
constants and quantifiers. Hence if we explain to a child by means of concrete
examples that (fa) follows from (x)fx we give an explanation of what the universal
quantifier means and teach him or her the technique of inferring (reasoning,
thinking). Note that the neo-Aristotelian conception of how children acquire the
ability to reason and think presupposes that children have already mastered some
rules for the use of words and sentences. Hence the ability to reason evolves out of
the ability to combine words and probably evolved during the course of evolution
for similar reasons (humans did not as the result of a mysterious macro-mutation
suddenly started to reason and think; see further Smit 2016).
Humans, as language-using creatures, become according to neo-Aristotelians
autonomous creatures when they can pursue self-selected goals that go beyond the
immediate environment in space and time. Animals, having a sensitive psyche, can
also pursue goals, but these are to a large extent restricted to the here and now. Neo-
Aristotelians emphasize that only a creature that has mastered rules for the use of
symbols and signs can pursue goals beyond the temporal and spatial present.
Consequently only in humans both the operations of the senses and the will are
suffused with (abstract) conceptualizations of the intellect. We are not only (at least
partially) in control of our desires and wants, but can pursue (abstract) goals and
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ideals (we can form rational desires). This also clarifies why only humans use tools
that require the mastery of concepts. The use of a clock is an example, for it requires
an understanding of the concept of time, but the use of a stick to collect termites is
not an example, for it does not require the use of a concept. Animals can
discriminate between colours, have food preferences, have pain, et cetera. Human
children acquire on top of that the concept of colour, taste, and pain. We, as
language-using creatures, have an intellect enabling us to subsume what we see
under universal concepts, can make objective judgments about what we see with the
aid of these concepts, and can understand the differences between empirical
judgments (‘This rose is pink’) and grammatical judgments (‘Red is darker than
pink’). Yet these typical linguistic abilities are of course connected to how we act
and take action, for, as I shall later explain, they evolved as an extension and
replacement of the conative behaviours which were already present in our ancestors.
4 Mental Sciences are Not a Young Science
The insight that (neo) Aristotelian monism is a serious alternative to Cartesian
dualism set the stage for the definitive (re) solution of the mind–body problem. An
important step toward its further resolution was taken by Wittgenstein in his
Philosophical Investigations. He realized that its resolution requires conceptual
investigations of how we can measure mental phenomena. If we do not realize that
there are conceptual problems involved, we will mistakenly believe that the problem
is an empirical problem requiring only further empirical studies. Wittgenstein (2009
[1953], Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment, par. 371) argued that:
The confusion and bareness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a
‘young science’; its state is not to be compared with that of physics, for
instance, in its beginnings. (…). For in psychology there are experimental
methods and conceptual confusion. (…).
The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the
means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method
pass one another by.
This remark was directed at the Gestalt psychologist Ko¨hler who had argued that the
situation in the mental sciences (psychology; nowadays we can add here cognitive
neuroscience) is comparable to the situation physics was in when it was a young
science. Physics developed according to Ko¨hler from a young into a mature science
as the result of transformation of qualitative observation into quantitative
measurement by means of sophisticated techniques and instruments. For example
observations of thermal properties (warm, cold) were replaced by indirect
quantitative measurement of temperature (changes in the state of, for example,
water as the result of changes in kinetic energy are used to measure changes in
temperature). Hence when physics developed into a mature science, qualitative
observation was progressively replaced by indirect quantitative measurement. These
new instruments facilitated the discovery of precise functional laws (for instance in
thermodynamics; see further below). Ko¨hler (1947, p. 42.) argued that:
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If we wish to imitate the physical sciences, we must not imitate them in their
contemporary, most developed form; we must imitate them in their historical
youth, when their state of development was comparable to our own at the
present state.
Wittgenstein objected to this idea. The problems confronting the mental sciences are
according to him not solved by replacing the qualitative descriptions (in terms of
our ordinary psychological vocabulary) by indirect quantitative descriptions in a
neurophysiological terminology (see Hacker 1996, chapter 5). He argued that the
development of quantitative methods and instruments in the mental sciences (for
example galvanographic or pneumographic methods or more modern methods such
as fMRI or ERP) does not result, as in physics, in the development of a mature
science out of a young one. For it was according to him a cardinal mistake that
Ko¨hler called psychology a young science comparable to physics in its early period.
While we can in physics replace thermal concepts (hot, warm, etc.) by concepts of
temperature for the purposes of physics, we cannot in a similar way eliminate
mental concepts (like believing that p, fearing that q, or intending to V) from
statements of psychological generalization and replace them by neurophysiological
concepts. ‘Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not the subject of
psychology in the same sense as that in which the movements of bodies, the
phenomena of electricity etc., are the subject of physics (Wittgenstein 2009 [1953],
par. 571). The reason is that mental phenomena are not hidden behind the
(observable) behaviours and linguistic expressions of the subject (see Hacker 1990a;
Malcolm 1986). By contrast: there are hidden collisions of molecules behind (our
observation of) an increase of temperature of a gas, just like there is a movement of
an electron behind the trace we observe in a Wilson cloud-chamber. The essential
point to notice is that the mental domain, in contrast to the physical domain, is not
populated with (hidden) mental objects, events, states or processes. The mental,
following the neo-Aristotelian conception, is manifest or expressed in behaviour and
is therefore directly observable. And the expressions of the mental have an essential
role in human communication. They are therefore the very explananda of the
science of the mental.
It is important to notice that the neo-Aristotelian conception does not exclude the
possibility that some behaviours are explicable in terms of a biological cause. But
neo-Aristotelians argue that we can and must differentiate causes of behaviour from
reasons. Suppose I am thirsty or hungry and am seeking the satisfaction of my thirst
or hunger. There may then be a biological cause for my simple conative behaviour,
namely serum osmolarity in the case of thirst or a hormonal cause (changing levels
of e.g. leptin or ghrelin) in the case of hunger because these hormones affect my
brain. Hence in these cases it is conceivable that we can extend and in part replace
our ordinary explanations (based on observing the behavioural and linguistic
expressions of the sensations) with an explanation involving a biological cause. But
suppose that I prepare for my wedding, am late, and rush to my car in order to pick
up the flowers that I ordered a few minutes before with my mobile phone, then it is
less easy to see how my volitional, goal-directed behaviour can be made intelligible
by a biological cause (a well-functioning endocrine, neuro-endocrine and nervous
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system is here not a cause but a causal condition enabling me to act in this
situation). The point to notice is that we make our behaviour intelligible in terms of
goals and reasons. For instance when someone, observing my behaviour when I am
sprinting to my car, asks me: ‘Why do you…’, I will answer by saying: ‘Because I
…’ (and not by explaining the causal conditions enabling me to act, namely by
saying that neurons in my prefrontal cortex are firing). Note that the reasons one
gives for one’s actions are warrants, not causes. At the proximate level it is therefore
far from clear if and how we can extend (let alone replace) explanations of acts in
terms of reasons by explanation in terms of (proximate) causes, for to take action or
to perform a deed is to act voluntarily in response to a circumstance or in pursuit of
a goal, given that the actor is capable of apprehending an opportunity and can opt
for or choose one course of action over another and is not acting under duress.
Humans have developed manifold forms of explanations of action in terms of goals
and reasons in which causal accounts do not play a role (for a survey, see Hacker
2007, chapter 5). Apparently, an evolutionary theorist will add, there has been
selection in favour of making behaviour intelligible in teleological terms since this
improved human communication and cooperation and, perhaps, enhanced therefore
the inclusive fitness of individuals living in human groups or societies. But even if
we are not inclined or willing to use an evolutionary explanation here and prefer a
cultural or historical explanation, we still have to note that this practise (the use of
teleological explanations of human actions for the purpose of making actions
intelligible to each other) has emerged during our (evolutionary) history.
Language evolution freed humans from the constraints imposed by genetic
evolution, for it enabled us to reason and to give reasons. But since language
evolved out of animal forms of communication, we can assume that at least the early
stages of language evolution are explicable in evolutionary terms. Hence the early
forms of linguistic behaviour were probably shaped by genetic evolution. This raises
the problem of how can we investigate the development of advanced forms of
linguistic behaviour (reasoning, giving reasons) out of simple forms of linguistic
behaviour. It is important to distinguish two aspects.
First, young children cannot reason or give reasons for their actions. Yet when
they have mastered the first use of some words, they are able to perform acts like
calling, asking and answering, or expressing wants and responding to wants of
others. These linguistic acts and responses are moves in (simple) language games
(doing things with words enables children to engage in social interactions). Notice
that these games are no longer biological games, i.e. the social interactions between
animals (involving signals like the bared teeth-display of dogs) that are studied by
evolutionary theorists with the aid of game theory (for instance the Hawk–Dove
model). Nowadays, these simple language games are extended by complex ones
culminating in the ability to engage in complex social interactions involving
reasoning and giving reasons. But this developmental pattern (from doing things
with words to reasoning and giving reasons) evolved during our (evolutionary)
history. In Aristotelian terms: the rational psyche evolved out of the sensitive
psyche when humans became sensitive to reasons for acting and responding. Hence
we have to explain if and how evolutionary or ultimate explanations are capable of
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answering the question of how the (human) rational psyche gradually evolved out of
the (animal) sensitive psyche.
Second, it is important to note that the development of the rational psyche
required teaching and learning, for the use of a language is a rule-governed activity.
Humans are unique for a biological reason: only in humans an innate ability evolved
to learn the rule-governed use of a language. But learning a language is also a
unique human capacity since the use of language involves the correct and incorrect
applications of rules. Learning the use of language was therefore linked to the
evolution of asymmetric roles in the family or group: the pupil had to understand
that the teacher is the one who is explaining something, whereas the teacher had to
check whether the pupil understood what was explained (Csibra and Gergely
2006, 2009). Recall that for example young chimpanzees learn to use tools (how to
fish termites with sticks) by imitation, not as the result of socially guided learning.
5 Thermodynamics
I mentioned above, while discussing Wittgenstein’s critique of Ko¨hler’s ideas, that
physics developed from a young into a mature science as the result of
transformation of qualitative observation (‘I feel that the fire is hot’) into
quantitative measurement by means of sophisticated techniques and instruments.
To understand Fisher’s contribution to the solution of the mind–body problem (next
section), it is helpful to return to the question of how observation of thermal
properties (warm, cold) were in physics replaced by quantitative, indirect
measurement of temperature.
Recall that the thermometer is a device that measures changes in the temperature
of a system as the result of changes in kinetic energy. And recall that for example
the volume of a gas in a thermodynamic system, at constant pressure, increases
proportionally to changes in temperature. In theory, the volume of a sample of gas
can therefore be used to measure temperature (theoretically, this can be derived
from the ideal gas law PV = nRT). The point to notice is that we measure (or
observe) then a macroscopic property or parameter of the whole thermodynamic
system (other properties are internal energy, entropy and pressure) that defines its
state. A thermodynamic system can be further characterized by the walls that
delimit the system and by its connections with its surroundings (for example by tiny
pores in the wall through which molecules can pass, or, in the case of the membrane
surrounding a cell, by its receptors and ion channels).
Macroscopic properties are distinguished from microscopic phenomena. We can
understand and study the macroscopic properties of the system without paying
attention to the (microscopic) movements, velocities and collisions of the molecules
constituting a gas or liquid (and the processes occurring at lower levels discussed by
quantum mechanics). Yet thermodynamics assumes that the macroscopic behaviour
of the system can be explained in terms of the microscopic behaviour of the very
large numbers of its constituents, i.e. molecules. The velocities and collisions of the
molecules determine the macroscopic properties, but since we, when we study a
macroscopic property, do not know exactly at a microscopic level the simultaneous
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positions and velocities of each molecule in a gas or liquid, we need statistics for
explaining the resulting thermodynamic behaviour of the whole system (its
macroscopic properties). Notice that the microscopic mechanical laws concerning
the position, velocity and collisions of molecules do not contain concepts such as
temperature or entropy.
Thermodynamic systems discussed in physics are a thermometer, refrigerator or
steam machine. In the context of the mind–body problem, it is important to notice
that chemical reactions (of which we can observe the macroscopic changes in a test
tube, e.g. changes in the colour or odour of a liquid3), cells and organisms are also
thermodynamic systems. This is an important observation, as I shall later discuss in
more detail, for chemical reactions are at the foot of the evolutionary tree, while
cells and multicellular organisms are the branches of the evolutionary tree because
they evolved out of these reactions when thermodynamic systems acquired heredity.
We can reconstruct how they became branches by studying their evolutionary
history at different levels of organization (phylogeny).
In both simple chemical reactions and complex organisms we can again
differentiate between microscopic and macroscopic levels, yet what microscopic
and macroscopic levels are depend on the evolutionary stage we investigate, for
evolution resulted in a nested hierarchy of different entities. The behaviour of a cell
is a macroscopic phenomenon relative to a chemical reaction, but a microscopic
phenomenon relative to the behaviour of a multicellular organism. For understand-
ing the increase in life’s complexity we have to notice that there have been
transitions to higher levels of organisation (for example from single cells to
multicellular organisms), but also that there is one level that is involved in all major
transitions. All evolutionary innovations are generated at a physical–chemical level,
i.e. the level of genes. Hence there is an important difference between explaining
changes in the macroscopic properties of a thermodynamic physical–chemical
system and explaining changes in the traits of a living being. Only in the case of
living creatures we can add an evolutionary explanation since living thermodynamic
systems have acquired heredity.
There is one other distinction we have to mention. Thermodynamics distin-
guishes closed and open systems. An open system, like a living organism, can and
does (and a closed system does not) obtain energy from the environment to
(actively) maintain its internal state (for example their bodily temperature) or to
maintain the stability of the whole system (of course, energy is also used for growth
and reproduction). This involves metabolic pathways. Maintenance and repair are
selected traits regulated by (the products of) genes. For example humans use energy
for repairing damage in their body (DNA-repair by enzymes at the chemical level,
but also wound healing and regeneration at the level of cells, tissues and organs). A
thermometer does not use energy in this sense although chemical energy (obtained
from electromagnetic waves) can alter its thermodynamic state.
Organisms can allocate energy to the systems which execute different functions
in their body. This observation is the key to understanding why the soma of
3 Notice that the sensitive psyche was not selected to detect microscopic changes, but, interestingly, can
detect macroscopic changes in colour or odour.
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organisms (with a germ line-soma separation) age. It is also the ultimate explanation
of the occurrence of age-related diseases of the brain (like Alzheimer’s disease).
Senescence is explicable in terms of the disposable soma theory, a theory deduced
from the principles of thermodynamics of open systems extended with evolutionary
genetics (see Kirkwood 1977). For understanding this theory we have to recall the
difference between machines and living organisms. Machines do not repair damage
and they deteriorate (the ultimate explanation is the second law of thermodynamics)
as the result of a gradual accumulation of damage over time. There is also
accumulation of damage in livings organisms, but this occurs because they put less
energy in repair and maintenance. Disposable soma theory explains aging in livings
organisms as the result of an accumulation of mutations in the somatic cells in our
body because we allocate less energy to maintenance and repair after a certain
moment in time, i.e. when most organisms in a population would have died because
of extrinsic causes of mortality.
6 Fisher’s Contribution: The Evolution of Aiming and Striving
Fisher noted that the findings of thermodynamics cannot be reconciled with the
ideas of theorists, like Descartes, who argue that the fundamental laws of the
universe are deterministic and believe that all systems are therefore determined by
mechanical laws (Fisher 1934; see also Fisher 1950). Thermodynamics shows a
disconnection between the mechanistic laws at the microscopic level (concerning
the movements and velocities of molecules) and the macroscopic properties of
thermodynamic systems. Fisher realized that there are interesting similarities here
between evolutionary theory and thermodynamics. In both theories it is observed
that aggregates (chemical reactions in a test tube, cells, or multicellular organisms)
have properties that are emergent although they are the result of causal processes
occurring at the level of the particles that constitute the aggregate.
The relevant example of an aggregate for understanding Fisher’s contribution to
the solution of the mind–body problem is the organism. It consists of cells (and its
smaller constituents), but the aggregate, the whole body, has properties at the
macroscopic level that are emergent but explicable as the outcome of processes
occurring at lower levels. There is order and harmony at the level of the whole
individual, but this order is, just like the macroscopic properties of a gas, the
outcome of random processes occurring at a microscopic level.
Fisher’s main contribution concerns the distinction between cause and effect and
how these terms are linked to changes occurring in thermodynamic systems.
Assume a cell with a membrane. Since the membrane, in contrast to a rigid cell
wall, is flexible, the cell is capable of adopting different shapes (like soap bubbles).
Since cells are alive, containing genes which are capable of affecting the cell’s
movements and interactions with other cells, we can imagine mutations having
specific effects. For example, some mutations can lead to cell migration (the cell
responds and moves to a chemical stimulus), other mutations can result in the
‘creation’ of so-called cilia enabling a cell to swim (for example a sperm cell), and
yet other mutations may enable cells to engulf and eat a small cell (phagocytosis).
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Fisher highlights that mutations (originating at the microscopic level) are
innovations only at the macroscopic level: mutations occur randomly as the result
of physical or chemical causes at the microscopic level (there is, relative to the level
of the cell, at this level randomness or indeterminacy), but these causes have
creative effects at the level of the behaviour of the cell. Most of these mutations
probably have disadvantageous effects, but some have advantageous effects and are
then selected in the population of cells if they enhance fitness. The essential point to
notice is that, according to Fisher, the creative effect has to be located in the effect
of the mutation on the interaction of the (whole) cell with its environment:
The process of mutation should not properly be regarded as a cause governing
the direction of evolutionary change, but only as a condition which renders
evolution possible. In the same way it is probable that in relation to any effect
of special interest we should never think of the casual component [e.g. of a
mutation, HS] of any one particular event as by itself creative, but should
recognize the creative quality as belonging only to aggregates of such casual
components (Fisher 1934, p. 116).
It is in the interaction of the (whole) organism with its environment that we locate
in time and place the effects of mutations resulting in evolutionary change.
Following the contribution of Johannsen (1910) to genetics, we can add that
selection on genotypic variation in a population, arising out of genetic mutation,
occurs at the level of the phenotype.
These observations enabled Fisher to criticize the ideas of Cartesians and,
important in the context of evolutionary theory, Lamarck. Cartesians (for example
Laplace) assumed that the future of a mechanical system can be calculated,
supposing that its initial state is known with absolute precision and that all laws of
nature are given. The future state of a system, according to Cartesian determinism,
does for this reason not admit a plurality of future possibilities. But this is according
to Fisher problematic, for the future of a thermodynamic system which has acquired
heredity does involve different possibilities. Of course, since Descartes assumed two
separate realms (bodies explicable in terms of mechanics, and human beings able to
act at will because only they have a mind), we can explain indeterminism in humans
as the result of the free will. But this is according to Fisher not a satisfying answer,
for it does not explain (and cannot explain) how willing evolved only in humans.
How can Cartesians explain that only in humans a free will evolved out of ‘lower
animals’ (our ancestors) that are essentially automata ruled by deterministic laws?
The problem is that we owe our evolution ‘to the same great causes which had
brought the rest of the animal creation into existence’ (Fisher 1934, p. 102).
Thermodynamics shows according to Fisher that it is more fruitful to assume
indeterminism (being a more general theory of natural causation) with determinism
as a special case (only correct for certain types of objects).
Indeterminism presupposes that actions of animals (including humans) are not
predetermined. The order and harmony we observe at the macroscopic level,
resulting from indeterministic processes at the lower level, could have been
different. Determinism, by contrast, assumes that every cause of an event is itself
caused by a prior event. Consequently, if determinism ascribes to any act the full
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sense of causation, it can only be to the act of creation by which the deterministic
universe was brought into existence. In this universe there is only a predetermined
pattern of events which is, mysteriously, perceived by us as ordered in a time
sequence running in one direction only, namely that events in the past cause future
events. The problem according to Fisher is that we live in a universe in which events
are not only understandable if they have a preceding cause, for we have also
knowledge of the future because humans (and the other animals) are ‘aiming and
striving’ creatures pursuing goals. For example we form intentions (‘I am going to
Amsterdam tomorrow’) enabling us to have knowledge of future events (if I listen to
someone uttering this sentence, then I can predict where he will be tomorrow)
without knowledge of a preceding cause. In Descartes’ universe ‘aiming and
striving’ in animals are merely an illusion, for in Descartes’ conception of the other
animals’ teleology does not play any role, since Descartes eliminated the
Aristotelian concept of a goal (Descartes objected to Aristotle’s teleology in
physics, chemistry and biology (but not in the study of man), while Fisher only
objected to Aristotle’s use of teleology in physics and chemistry).4 The problem is
that goal-directed behaviours of animals are then treated as merely illusions (for
animals are according to Descartes essentially machines which can only respond).
Although it appears that animals can act or refrain from acting, pursue goals and
have preferences, they are according Descartes automata. Consequently, ‘aiming
and striving’ in other animals cannot in Descartes’ universe be of selective
advantage, for these behaviours do not have any reality in Descartes’ universe but
are mere appearances. But according to Fisher’s goal-directed behaviours are
advantageous (1934, p. 108):
An indeterministic world, then, is one in which the human qualities of
aspiration, planning and foresight, are rationally possible and may be
advantageous, and in which we can recognize the primitive precursors of
these qualities, not as an epiphenomenon, but as having a real part to play in
the survival or death of the organisms that evince them. Biologically it might
be said that purposive action by the organism as a whole is the crowning stage
of an evolutionary process by which relatively large masses of living matter
have come to achieve that co-operation of parts and unity of structure which
we call individuality. For, on a statistical view of causation, spontaneity or
creative causation is at its highest only when perfect unity is achieved.
This insight enabled Fisher to discuss an important difference between Lamarck’s
and Darwin’s theory. Both on the Lamarckian and Darwinian theories creative
causation is centered in the whole organism. The contribution of each is made
effective, however, on the Lamarckian view by ‘willing and striving’ and on the
Darwinian view by ‘doing or dying’. Lamarck (1984 [1809], Part 1, chapter 7) had
to assume that new (adaptive) ways of satisfying desires (arising because organisms
always explore the environment and accidentally develop a new habit) evolve
because these new habits have the power to induce at the microscopic level
4 Notice that we can reconcile Fisher’s ideas for this reason with the (neo) Aristotelian conception of the
mind and body, but not with Descartes’ conception.
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(molecules constituting our genes) heritable changes which should enable corre-
sponding desires and efforts in the offspring to be more perfectly satisfied. But the
change occurring at level of the molecules is then no longer random, but becomes
the creative cause itself. This idea is mistaken for empirical reasons (see Smit
2010c), but also in contradiction with the principles of thermodynamics. In Fisher’s
theory changes at the level of molecules occur randomly and become creative
causes because of their effects at the level of the aggregate. His theory, just as in
thermodynamics, makes no assumption about the causes by which new mutations at
lower levels arise. Natural selection results at the proximate level in ‘willing and
striving’ agents, but these are at the ultimate level the outcome of a process that
always begins with randomness or indeterminism. But goal-directed behaviours did
evolve, for:
Consciousness and more or less intelligent mental life would seem to have
played an increasing part in the adaptation of the higher animals to their
surroundings, and the diversity and intricate possibilities of these surroundings
seems to have provided a necessary and sufficient condition for such mental
development (Fisher 1934, p. 111).
For understanding Fisher’s contribution to the solution of the mind–body problem,
we have to notice five features of his theory.
First, Fisher highlights the fact that the evolution of the human rational psyche is,
just as the evolution of the vegetative psyche of plants and the sensitive psyche of
the other animals, not an epiphenomenon. The evolution of the mind is explicable in
terms of Darwin’s theory if we notice that the psyche evolved out of lower-level
entities that display exploratory behaviour. Moreover the mind (recall that we
characterize the mind in Aristotelian terms, namely by the organism’s capacities
visible in the behaviour they display) has a role in the evolutionary process, for
selection acts on the organism exercising its capacities. Fisher realized that,
although evolutionary innovations arise at the physical–chemical level (DNA),
mutations affect the behaviour of a whole organism exercising its capacities,
including its mental capacities. These mental capacities are not capacities of a
separate mind (as Cartesians believed) or of the brain. For example mutations may
improve the ability of the whole organism to see with eyes and this improvement is
visible in its behaviour.5 Notice that the behaviour of the brain may be also
emergent, explicable by reference to the interactions of its parts. But the behaviour
of a human being is not an emergent or supervenient property of the brain. That we
see with eyes, mean something, or can use our hands to point and to write our name
is not a property of the brain.
Second, Fisher’s theory highlights the fact that, although organisms pursue goals,
we do not need to assume a vital force for explaining how goal-directed activities
5 Eyes (or brains) cannot be said to see; it is the whole sentient being that perceives (see further Bennett
and Hacker 2003; Smit and Hacker 2014). If someone has poor eyesight, his eyes do not see poorly, but
he sees poorly. We say so because we observe that he, not his eyes (or his brain), has problems in finding
his way around (he bumps into thing or falls over things and cannot find things by looking, etc.). Seeing or
walking are predicates applicable to the whole, behaving human being using his eyes and legs, not to the
parts (eyes, legs).
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and acts evolved. ‘Aiming and striving’, although they occur in living nature, are
not vital forces which we can use as parts of ultimate explanations. They are
evolved (proximate) goal-directed behaviours.
Third, higher level aggregates or collectives acquire as the result of evolution
properties that are not present at the level of their constituents. Fisher highlights the
fact that effects of random (lower-level) mutations result in the emergence of
macroscopic properties since it is the whole organism that interacts with its
environment.
Fourth, Fisher’s theory clarifies why we attribute psychological predicates to the
whole organism, not to its parts (just as we ascribe temperature to the macroscopic
properties of a whole system, not to the molecules). His theory fits therefore within
the conceptual framework of neo-Aristotelian monism, for Fisher’s contribution
clarifies why we ascribe mental predicates to the whole behaving individual (and not
to a gene, a cell or an organ like the brain). That we ascribe mental predicates to the
whole behaving organism is called by neo-Aristotelians a principle of mereology
(Hacker 2007). It is illuminating to note that this principle also applies to computers
or calculators (see Kenny 1984, chapter 10, 1989, chapter 10). We can distinguish
the (microscopic) processes going on in the hardware from the outcome of a
calculation (made possible by these processes). The point to notice is that the
outcome is dependent on the keys (for example the multiplication or square-root
key) and the output display. The calculation can be done with many different wired
electronic devices (there is to a certain extent randomness at the level of the
hardware), but this is not where the calculation can be located (there is no
calculation going on in the hardware separated from the keys and output display).
Only the whole calculator can do calculations for us.6 Hence just as Fisher
emphasized that evolutionary adaptations are located in the interaction of whole
organisms with the environment, Kenny noticed that calculation is located in the
interaction between the whole calculator (or computer) and its users.
Fifth, Fisher’s theory explains why there is direction or progress in evolution, just
as there is direction in thermodynamic systems. The latter is explicable by the
second law of thermodynamics, the first direction in terms of Fisher’s well-known
fundamental theorem of natural selection (see Fisher 1930).
7 Hamilton’s Inclusive Fitness Theory
Fisher (1934, p. 108) made two observations. First, goal-directed behaviour
displayed by an individual is the crowning stage of evolution and, second, evolution
of goal-directed behaviour requires unity of the lower-level structures constituting
the individual. Hamilton’s contribution is an elaboration of the second observation:
he developed a general theory explaining how higher level individuals evolve out of
lower-level entities as the result of cooperation between lower-level entities and the
6 Although strictly speaking calculators do not (cannot) calculate, any more than clocks can tell the time




suppression of conflict. The result was that Fisher’s analogy with thermodynamic
systems was, in part, replaced by a social theory capable of explaining both
cooperation and conflict.
Hamilton’s theory is an actor-oriented theory (see West and Gardner 2013): it
explains the changes in the fitness of an actor as the result of an interaction with a
recipient. The theory has two principles for explaining cooperation (Gardner, West
and Wild 2011; Hamilton 1964). Cooperation can evolve as the result of direct or
indirect fitness benefit. Direct fitness benefits occur when both the actor and
recipient benefit from the interaction (called mutual benefit), i.e. when the benefits
are higher than the costs of the act (B[C). Indirect fitness benefits occur when
actor and recipient are genetically related: if the fitness of the recipient increases as
the result of the action of the actor, then this fitness increase indirectly contributes to
the fitness of the actor if the indirect benefits multiplied by the relation coefficient is
higher than the costs of the act (rB[C). This is called altruism. Notice that mutual
benefit and altruism are here used as technical terms.
In order to illustrate how Hamiltonian social theory explains phenomena, I
discuss how the kingdoms of plants and animals evolved out of a lower-level
creature, namely the eukaryotic cell, and how the eukaryotic cell itself, a symbiosis
between two different cells, evolved out of prokaryotic ancestors. Hamilton’s theory
is the sole theory capable of explaining why they evolved (Bourke 2011; Maynard
Smith and Szathma´ry 1995; Okasha 2006).
There are three cellular domains: Archea and Eubacteria (together they form the
prokaryotes), and the Eukaryota (animals, fungi and plants belong to this domain).
There are many differences between the prokaryotes and the eukaryotes, but I shall
only briefly discuss two of them. First, prokaryotes have a rigid outer cell wall,
enabling them to live in water: it keeps them from swelling up and bursting like a
balloon as water moves across the concentration gradient from the external medium
to the cytoplasm. However, the cell wall has a disadvantage, for the cell can only
feed off molecules that move through it. Eukaryotes do not have a cell wall but a
cytoskeleton consisting of a network of protein filaments anchored to the cell
membrane. This cytoskeleton stabilizes the cell from within like the steel girders of
a modern building. The advantage is that the cell can predate on bacteria by
engulfing them (i.e. by folding its membrane around them, i.e. by phagocytosis), for
it has a flexible membrane at the outside. Second, the eukaryotic cell does, and the
prokarytotic cell does not, have cell organelles. The point to notice is that cell
organelles were originally free-living bacteria. One explanation of how bacteria
became cell organelles (endosymbionts) is that in a proto-eukaryotic cell feeding on
bacteria, some of the bacteria survived. If we assume that the encased bacteria
provided the host cell with some useful molecules (as by-product of their
metabolism), one can easily imagine the emergence of a cooperative (or symbiotic)
relation between the host cell and the bacteria. Hence instead of digesting them, the
bacteria were subsequently domesticated by the host cell and became cell
organelles. Inclusive fitness theory explains the emergence of endosymbionts as
the result of mutual benefit: the host cell and bacteria were genetically unrelated but
cooperation was beneficial because different functions were combined in a new
(higher-level) creature: the eukaryotic cell.
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For the origin of multicellularity inclusive fitness theory provides us with a
different explanation. It is believed that the first step from independent cells to
multicellular organisms was the formation of cell clusters. If we assume that these
clusters consisted of cells that were genetically identical because the multicellular
cluster was started from a single cell, then cooperation between the cells can be
explained by kin selection (kin selection is part of inclusive fitness theory).
Moreover, since the cells were identical, there were in small multicellular clusters
no costs involved related to the suppression of cheaters. One can imagine that cells
started to exchange molecules between them enhancing inclusive fitness. Cells
could extend their cooperative interactions by producing ligands and receptors
resulting in chemical communication: one cell could signal to another cell and alter
its behaviour. Another important innovation was cell differentiation as the result of
new mechanisms of gene regulation. When the differentiated cell state was also
maintained during cell division (by, again, a new, epigenetic mechanism),
specialized cells evolved which together with other cells could form organs that
could execute different functions in the organism (e.g. heart or kidneys). The
activities of these organs were regulated and coordinated resulting in different
systems, e.g. the cardio-vascular system involved in the transport of oxygen and
nutrients through the whole organism. Hence communications between cells
resulted in a division of labour (epigenesis resulted in several organs executing
different functions) and, subsequently, gave rise to organ systems, such as the
immune system involved in the defence against pathogens, or the endocrine and
nervous system regulating our metabolism and behaviour. From an evolutionary
point of view, the relevant division of labour was the separation between non-
reproductive somatic cells and the reproductive cells or gametes (see Michod 2007;
West et al. 2015). This division of labour is explained by inclusive fitness theory in
terms of altruism. Because the genes in somatic cells and gametes are identical
(r = 1), we can use kin selection for explaining why the altruistic behaviour of
somatic cells evolved.
8 Facilitated Evolution
Fisher argued that lower-level exploratory behaviours are involved in the evolution
of higher-level adaptations. I discuss in this section how lower-level exploratory
behaviour facilitated the evolution of higher-level adaptations. I start again with the
ideas of Lamarck because he too highlighted an important role of exploratory
behaviour.
Lamarck, as we have seen above, advanced the idea that exploratory behaviour is
the beginning of the evolution of adaptations. For example when some birds, as a
result of their exploratory behaviour, started to forage on fish, their bill had to
lengthen to reach the fish and their toes had to be stretched in order to create webbed
feet. Over generations, this resulted according to Lamarck gradually in the required
adaptations for their predatory behaviour (see Lamarck 1984 [1809], p. 119ff.). The
point to notice is that in Lamarck’s theory behavioural needs and wants drive the
anatomy and physiology. Hence it is not changes in the shape, either of the body or
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its parts, which gives rise to the new habits of the birds, but it is the other way
round: the habits, which are the result of aiming and striving (goal-directed action),
lead in the end to changes in the shape (and physiology) of the body and of the parts
of animals.
We know that these ideas of Lamarck are wrong for empirical reasons. Although
there are adaptations occurring at the level of the somatic cells, these adaptations do
not affect the gametes in a similar way, because the determinants in egg and sperm
cells, as Weismann (1983 [1904], see also Smit 2010c) later argued against
Lamarck, are not miniature somatic cells (e.g. muscle, skin, or nerve cells).
We can extend Fisher’s alternative explanation of the origin of novelties by using
the idea of facilitated evolution: a single, random mutation can have beneficial
macroscopic effects for the cells that are affected by the mutation are embedded in a
network or circuit of other cells (in which the mutation does not have an effect) that
are capable of adjusting their activities and behaviour to the changes occurring in
the mutated cell. Facilitated evolution means that mutations may lead to functional
responses because they have effects in a microenvironment involving lower-level
entities like cells and chemical reactions that are capable of displaying exploratory
behaviour and can therefore contribute to the macroscopic adaptive response. I
illustrate facilitated evolution by discussing an example taken from Kirschner and
Gerhart (2005).
Recall that we (and the other animals) are able to adapt to changes in levels of
oxygen. First, if our body is confronted by lower levels of oxygen (for example
when we are running or are hiking in the mountains), then our body physiologically
responds by an increase in the rate of breathing. Second, there is also a chemical
mechanism that enables us to cope with lower levels of oxygen: the molecule that
binds oxygen in our blood, haemoglobin, can adopt two configurations, and one of
these can bind oxygen better. This enables our body, if necessary, to switch to more
molecules with the configuration that binds oxygen better (increasing the level of
oxygen in our blood). Third, there is also a cellular mechanism involved: if there are
lower levels of oxygen, cells start to produce a growth factor (erythropoietin, better
known as EPO because it was misused in blood doping for endurance sports like
bicycling in order to improve performances) resulting in an increase in the number
of red blood cells. And fourth, the body responds by the production of new blood
capillaries. If there is not enough oxygen in a local environment (in a certain tissue
of our body), then cells start to secrete a growth factor resulting in the production of
a new capillary: it grows out of an already existing capillary in the direction from
which the signal was released. That vessels are responsive to low levels of oxygen
(hypoxia) was discovered in premature infants. When they were exposed to high
levels of oxygen, they have reduced capillary growth. But when they were returned
to normal oxygen conditions, the tissues that were previously oxygen-starved grew
extraordinarily with disastrous consequences: for example their eyes leaked and
bled, leading to scarring and to blindness.
The point to notice is that the fourth mechanism is also involved in the
development of our vascular system (and during the development of the placenta).
Blood vessels are formed in two ways: from specialized embryonic cells called
angioblasts, and from existing blood vessels. In the early stages of development
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angioblasts coalesce and form hollow tubes, initiated by a growth factor. This step is
highly deterministic and results in large vessels like the aorta and the major veins.
But the development of smaller vessels (called angiogenesis) is partly on demand
(as I have described above) and is not genetically pre-programmed. They sprout
from already existing vessels. This depends on the local situation (oxygen level) in
the tissues of the developing body. This is visible if we look at the different
branches of the blood vessels just beneath the skin of our legs, arms or hands. There
are always asymmetries here (e.g. between the left and right hand) which can be
explained in terms of the on demand-process (explicable in terms of the integrated
actions of lower-level cells).
For obvious reasons the ‘on demand’ system is adaptive, for it enables organisms
to respond to damage: the processes are involved in wound healing and
regeneration. But it requires no stretch of the imagination to see that these
processes also enabled organisms to adapt to changes in the environment during our
evolutionary history. Suppose that as a result of one mutation of genes in a cartilage
cell (part of the skeleton) bones lengthen. This could result in the lengthening of a
limb of which the bone is a part because of the on demand-system: the blood vessel
system would automatically respond to the new situation by developing new
vessels. A similar story can be told in the case of the development of muscle and
nerve cells, for these cells, originating out of precursor cells present in the local
environment, are also capable of responding to what is needed in the local situation.
Muscle cells are formed in the trunk in clusters close to the nerve cord. They
migrate from this site outward and follow an exploratory path closely linked to the
developing blood vessel system. These precursor cells proliferate and differentiate
then in response to local cues. Nerve cells also follow an exploratory path into the
developing limb: cells extend their (long) axon and the axon tip by chance muscle
cells. Since axons make multiple contacts with the muscle cells in the limbs, there is
selection in favour of cells with the strongest signal. Thus changes in size or shape
of the limb as the result of one mutation in a cell of the skeleton do not require new
mutations of the cells involved in the developments of the capillaries, muscles and
nervous system. The communication between cells in a multicellular organism
results therefore in opportunities to ‘create’ changes at the macro-level (the circuits
of interacting cells) as the result of one micro-mutation.7 In the webbing of the foot
in birds that started to predate on fish a similar story can be told. The point to notice
here is that the webbing of the bird’s foot is a default state: the cells between the
toes in birds that do not swim are later removed by cell suicide (apoptosis). We can
easily imagine a mutation involved in apoptosis blocking the process of cell suicide,
resulting in the webbed foot in birds that predate on fish.
These examples show that by noticing the exploratory behaviours of lower-level
entities and how they are involved in the evolution of higher-level entities, we can
explain how changes in morphological structures gradually resulted in new
adaptations (note that this is the opposite of what Lamarck argued). This solves the
problem of how simultaneous changes in the body are brought about in order to
7 Mutations of genes involved in the regulation of the new macro-level structure can subsequently
stabilize the change by bringing it under genetic control.
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establish function at the level of an aggregate (wing, hand, etc.) allowing selection
to act on the novel structure. Note the difference with machines (and recall their role
in the Cartesian conception of bodies). Suppose that we increase the number of
cylinders of the car from four to six. Numerous other modifications are then
necessary in order to make these cylinders functional. Importantly, without
simultaneous modifications in the crankshaft, the oiling and cooling system, and the
ignition system, the car would run poorly or would not run at all. In terms of
mechanical evolution: there would be strong selection against this increase in the
number of cylinders. Facilitated evolution shows why this is less of a problem in
living creatures since the different types of cells display exploratory behaviour and
which can, as the result of macroscopic selection, can be integrated in a higher–level
system or circuitry.
9 The Evolution of the Rational Psyche
We have seen that Fisher highlighted the fact that natural selection results in active
creatures that explore their environment. We have also seen that exploratory
behaviour at lower levels (e.g. migration) facilitates the evolution of higher–level
adaptations (e.g. the wing of a bird or the hand of a human). I shall discuss in this
section how exploratory behaviour (displayed by our ancestors and the other
animals) facilitated language evolution and, hence, the evolution of the human
rational psyche.
Hamilton argued that there is exploratory, goal-directed behaviour discernable at
all levels of organisation. Yet there are of course differences in the kind of goal-
directed behaviours displayed by lower- and higher-level creatures. The point to
notice is that evolutionary transitions resulted in an increase in life’s complexity:
new kinds of goal-directed behaviours evolved at higher levels of organisation, but
also the repertoire of goal-directed behaviours expanded. The main problem we face
when we study the evolution of the human rational psyche is what its precursors are,
for only humans use a language. Moreover, the use of a language is a normative
practice. I shall argue that we can solve this problem if we notice that the rule-
governed use of words evolved out of babbling (both during evolution and
ontogenesis). For this answers the question what the precursors are and how out of
babbling new (higher-level) adaptations could evolve.
Children are experimenters exploring their environment. They start to experiment
with gestures and vocalizations from early on, i.e. during the second half of their
first year. Children begin then to act upon objects around them by moving them at
will and by bringing about changes in objects, e.g. by pushing and pulling them,
touching them, or picking them up and handling them and, important for language
development, by giving them to their parents. Because children are experimenters,
observing is also to see what happens when one acts on objects. While they explore
their environment, their vocalizing powers develop and this is at first interwoven
with motor development and the development of gestural abilities (see among others
Bates and Dick 2002; Iverson 2010).
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The changes occurring in their vocalizing powers are from babbling to canonical
or reduplicated babbling to the use of words (Oller 2000). Importantly, babbling
induces or invites socially guided vocal learning by parents, i.e. when children start
to babble, their parents are inclined to join the activity children are at that moment
engaged in and respond to their experimental activities and vocalizations with infant
directed speech. Children begin then to respond to the cues and encouragement
provided by their parents by improving their skills and vocal capacities.8
An important pattern in babbling is the serial pattern in the case of canonical
babbling: the alternation of vowels and consonants. Note that this is also the basic
pattern of words. Hence for understanding the evolution of speech it is essential to
answer the question of what led to alternation of vowels and consonants. For if we
understand the basic patterns of vowel-consonant alternation, we can explain how
the use of more complex patterns was superimposed on these basic patterns
resulting in the ability to do various things with words. MacNeilage (2008) has
argued that the basic pattern of speech is the continual rhythmic alternation between
an open and closed mouth imposed on the sound production process. The production
of the first vowels (e.g. [a]) involves the opening of the mouth, whereas the
production of the first consonants (e.g. [b]) involves the closing of the mouth. The
assumption here is that during the early stages of language development the infant
exerts independent control only of the jaw, while others articulators (lips, tongue
and soft palate) had limited capacity to actively vary their position in the brief span
of a syllable. For example during jaw oscillation, if the tongue is in its resting
position, the elevating movements of the mandible will make the lips form a passive
constriction and produce a labial consonant, while lowering the jaw produce a
central vowel. When the ability to exert control on the articulators increased,
variegation emerged (involving cortical regulation of speech9). Hence after the
stage of reduplicated babbling the original reiterations (‘Bababa’) were replaced by
utterances in which children produce for example different consonants and/or
vowels in successive syllables (e.g. from ‘Mamama’ and ‘Tototo’ to ‘Tomato’).
It is possible that, during our evolutionary history, babbling had a signalling
function, for example in the context of mother–child interaction (as an extension of
motor patterns involved in sucking, licking, chewing) or in the context of grooming
(it is presupposed here that babbling possibly evolved out of lip smacking). I suggest
that the original small repertoire of signals extended as the result of an increase in
vocal flexibility (involving the tongue and the lips) into a complex, combinatorial
8 This requires vocal flexibility. Vocal flexibility, in contrast to flexibility of gesture, was probably
limited in the early hominins. It evolved as the result of selection of variations of genes such as FOXP2
(because the product of this transcription factor is, among other things, involved in the control of fine
orofacial movements, enabling the hominins to develop articulate speech; see Enard 2011) and co-
evolved with flexibility of gesture.
9 Since vocalizations (signals) in ‘lower’ animals are regulated by the midbrain (and, in part, by limbic
structures), we only have to assume that, as the result of exploratory behaviour of cortical neurons (see
Sect. 8), the articulators (jaw, lips, tongue) and the muscles of the larynx came under cortical control,
resulting in an expansion of the volitional vocal powers displayed by the whole organism (see also
Deacon 1997, chapter 8; Fitch 2010, chapter 9).
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system (assuming that the extension enhanced inclusive fitness).10 It is assumed that
good imitation skills and later more complex forms of learning were essential here.
The crucial step in this scenario is that signals acquired in the end meaning, i.e. the
signal ‘mama’ became then the spoken word for ‘mother’. In terms of the theory
advanced here: the signal became a spoken word when humans were able to do
something with this utterance, e.g. as a call or exclamation (‘Mama!’) resulting in
maternal attention. Not surprisingly, there was probably at first no sharp distinction
between the first use of words and signals, because both were produced to draw (or
direct) the attention of another (to something). Yet language development and
evolution result in the transition to a normative practice, for children learn to use
words correctly (this is further explained in Smit 2016). They learn what is to be
done. A child can be said to have mastered the use of a word (say ‘red’) if his or her
linguistic behaviour accords with the acknowledged rules for the correct employ-
ment of that word. For example a child understands what red is if he or she points to
a ripe tomato for explaining the meaning of ‘red’, can correct mistakes of others and
him- or herself, and so on and so forth. Whether a child possesses the ability to use
words and sentences is determined by testing whether he or she (1) can use a
language (e.g. words) correctly, (2) can explain its use correctly, and (3) responds
appropriately to its use in context.
Because explanations of meaning remain within language, the pedagogical
history (i.e. the gestures and vocalizations that were essential parts of the preceding
forms of teaching and learning) dropped off. For a creature’s pedagogical history is
not a criterion for whether a creature has the ability to speak a language. We do not
determine whether an alien is speaking a language or just emitting noise by
investigating his past—we investigate what he can now do. Whether a child
possesses this ability is determined by testing whether he can use a language
correctly. To have acquired the ability to use a language, as Wittgenstein (2009
[1953], par. 150) put it, is to have mastered a technique, and the technique mastered
is a normative one. Hence learning a language is important, but whether a child has
mastered a language is only tested by the end product. Hence when language
evolved from the first words to an expanded vocabulary with a grammar, it became
irrelevant how someone has learnt a language.
Doing things with words is during ontogenesis and was during evolution
expanded with reasoning and giving reasons (thinking; see Hacker 2013, chapter 10).
10 Babbling and later linguistic behaviour possibly evolved when hominins started to wean children at
earlier time (see Smit 2009, 2013). This became possible when they started to cooperate in the context of
hunting large game (but also in the context of digging tubers, etc.). Food was (in the evolving hunter-
gatherer societies) then present at a regular basis, enabling hominins to wean children at an earlier time,
for humans could use protein-rich meat (but also plant food and tubers) as supplement to and alternative
for maternal milk. Lactational anoestrus was therefore removed at an earlier age. The result was that
hominins had a much shorter interbirth interval than the other apes, but also a longer juvenile dependence
(nowadays, weaning occurs in natural fertility populations at about 1–4 years, while chimpanzees wean at
5 and orang-utans at 7.7 years). However, installing earlier weaning required several adaptations. For
example ‘tiny incisors’ (milk teeth) evolved enabling children to consume solid food at an early age (milk
teeth are absent in other apes). It also required behavioural adaptations enabling mothers and children to
adjust their communicative behaviour to early weaning. I have suggested that babbling (but also gestures
like pointing, etc.) and later linguistic behaviour evolved because these behaviours optimized the
functioning of food provisioning in the family and group, and, hence, increased inclusive fitness.
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During ontogenesis this occurs when children, during their third and fourth year,
acquire the ability to combine words; to describe, judge and assert something; to use
a tensed language and logical connectives, quantifiers, personal pronouns, etc.
Children acquire then the ability to reason, can think conditional thoughts, can think
of how things are and how things are not, can conceive of general truths, can think
of what does and what does not exist, can use modal expressions and counterfac-
tuals, etc. Hence using a complex language enables children to think of possibilities
(to imagine). They can think what would happen if…, or what it would be like if…,
because they can imagine something differently and begin to understand that one
can think falsely. Children can then express thoughts and beliefs and begin then to
understand that others have thoughts and beliefs. This explains why developmental
psychologists have found that children, who have mastered the use of a tensed
language, et cetera, can solve false belief tasks at this age (although it is misguided
to argue that they acquire then a Theory of Mind; see Smit 2010b).
Acquiring the ability to reason and to give reasons explains also why children
then develop purposes beyond the immediate environment in space and time, since
they can then express thoughts about the future and past. Hence there is a difference
between the intentional behaviour of doers and thinkers, between simple and
complex forms of heralding an intention. Simple forms are linked to acts like
giving, taking, wanting, etc. In these cases forming and heralding an intention is
linked to what children will do next (‘Give toy’ or ‘Take toy’ are followed by the act
of giving or taking). Older children (3–4 years old) learn to extend these primitive
forms of intentional actions with more complex ones when they have mastered the
use of a tensed language, et cetera, enabling them to form long-term intentions (e.g.
‘I’ll see you next Wednesday’ or ‘I will return the toy I borrow from you next
Wednesday’). The nexus between expressions of intentions and immediate
performance weakens then: children acquire the skill to refer to entities outside
the communication-situation, to talk about persons who are not present, to focus
their attention on something unrelated to current needs and wishes, and so on and so
forth. They have acquired the rational psyche.
10 Conclusion
I have discussed how we can extend the resolution of the mind–body problem of
philosophers with its solution, by showing how we can integrate neo-Aristotelian
monism with modern evolutionary theory so that we are able to construct and solve
empirical problems. My discussion can be summarized in three key points.
First, for the resolution of the mind–body problem it is essential to return to
Aristotelian monism, for this resolves the Cartesian problem of how the mind
interacts with the body (or brain for that matter). The important point to notice is
that Aristotle correctly noticed that there is no relation between the mind and body
(as Cartesians assume). We can study the psyche by observing the expressions of the
mental in the behaviour of living organisms, for the psyche is manifest in what
organisms do and can do.
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Second, the contributions of Fisher and Hamilton explain how out of
thermodynamic systems that have acquired heredity the three cellular domains
evolved. We can discern several evolutionary transitions which we can study if we
pay attention to how lower-level exploratory behaviour of entities facilitated the
evolution of higher level structures that obtained new functions. This sheds new
light on a conceptual observation already made by Aristotle, namely that we
attribute psychological predicates to the whole, behaving organism, not to its parts
(Hacker’s mereological principle). I have discussed how facilitated evolution
resulted in behaviours (e.g. displayed by multicellular organisms) which are
emergent, higher-level adaptations. In Aristotelian terms: the vegetative and
sensitive psyche evolved during the transition from unicellular to multicellular
organisms (internal and external organs evolved in plants and self-moving animals).
The rational psyche evolved as the result of another transition, namely the transition
from animal signalling to linguistic communication. Just as the exploratory
behaviour of cells made higher-level (emergent) structures, traits and functions of
multicellular organisms possible, so too the exploratory behaviour of our
(multicellular) ancestor made the evolution of the rational psyche possible. I have
discussed how out of babbling first ‘doing things with words’ and later ‘reasoning
and giving reasons’ evolved when our ancestors started to use word combinations,
grammar and later judgments and inferences (when they started to use ‘therefore’,
‘it follows’, or ‘so’ to make chains of reasoning). Future studies will show how
genetic variations, which only occur in humans, have altered the exploratory
behaviour of cells in our nervous system in such way that higher-level adaptations
could evolve (e.g. the evolution of volitional speech as the result of the altered
behaviour of neurons involved in the cortical regulation of our speech apparatus, or
the extension of experience-dependent learning as the result of an increase in brain
plasticity). Hence we can predict that the evolution of the rational psyche was made
possible by genetic variations involved in the expansion of our vocalizing powers
and in socially guided learning (examples are discussed in Smit 2013, 2014). Notice
that (an increase of) ‘information-processing’ in the brain or mind (as is assumed in
cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology) does not play any role in the
explanation of language ontogenesis and evolution (and hence, does not explain
why providing and seeking information in humans evolved), for there is no such
thing as information-processing in the brain (or mind). The misguided idea that
information-processing in the brain is essential for understanding language
evolution can be traced back to the Cartesian conception extended with (an
incorrect interpretation of) Darwin’s theory (see Bennett and Hacker 2006, 2015;
Smit 2011, 2014).
Third, Fisher, Hamilton and others have argued that, although language evolution
resulted in the rational psyche, language evolution did not result in a new biological
entity. Yet it was a transition since it led to new ways of communicating. Notice
again the difference with the Cartesian conception: doing things with words and
later reasoning and giving reasons are not brought about by the activity of alleged
entities as the immaterial Self (Descartes) or the material brain (many contemporary
neuroscientists and evolutionary psychologists). There is no such thing as a separate
entity (mind, brain) causing linguistic, volitional acts (and it does not receive
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linguistic information). We are composed of integrated parts which evolved as the
result of evolutionary transitions, but it is the (whole) agent that acts and takes
action, seeks and provides information, not its mind or brain. Hamilton’s inclusive
fitness theory teaches us that we (as agents) consist of cooperative parts that are
functionally integrated and have traits not present at lower levels.
The expansion of our vocalizing powers resulted in the evolution of the human
rational psyche. But when complex language games evolved enabling humans to
reason and to give reasons, the constraints of genetic evolution were removed:
natural evolution was in part replaced by cultural evolution. Hence the theory
discussed in this paper clarifies why the many genes that are unique to humans are
involved in the transition from nature to culture: they do no longer cause us to act,
but became progressively involved in brain processes that enable us to act11 (brain
processes became a causal condition). As the result of language evolution the
capacity to pursue self-selected goals expanded and this became, in Fisher’s words,
the crowning stage of natural evolution. Yet because the rules for the use of words
and sentences (grammar) are autonomous (they are not grounded in nature or human
nature), they only support each other resulting in a free-floating network of
concepts. Intentional behaviour, made possible by language evolution, was therefore
not only the crowning stage of natural evolution, but also marked the shift from
natural to cultural evolution resulting in religion, technology, science, etc. This part
of our journey is therefore better explained, not by evolution, but by our history.
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